

All About Factors

What are they? Can we time them? How should we diversify them?

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About Newfound Research

Founded in August 2008, Newfound Research is quantitative asset management firm based out of Boston, MA.

Investing at the intersection of quantitative and behavioral finance, Newfound Research is dedicated to helping clients achieve their longterm goals with research-driven, quantitatively-managed portfolios, while simultaneously acknowledging that the quality of the journey is just as important as the destination.

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Global Research Readership

Audiences across the globe regularly utilize our data-driven investment research to help make portfolio management decisions within institutional mandates





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"If I buy a smart-beta ETF and short the market, am I net long smart?"

As told to Corey Hoffstein by Eric Balchunas, Senior ETF Analyst at Bloomberg Intelligence



So what are factors?

The Standard Capital Asset Pricing Model A "Single Factor" Model

$$r_p = r_f + \beta (r_m - r_f) + \epsilon$$



Increased exposure to systematic risk implies increased return



Risk-Free Rate

(Uncompensated) Noise



The goal of active investing...

 $r_p \neq \alpha + r_f + \beta (r_m - r_f) + \epsilon$

SWEET, SWEET "RISK-FREE" ALPHA



$r_p = \alpha + r_f + \beta (r_m - r_f) + \epsilon$ Risk free???



Some assumptions we usually make...

$$r_p = \alpha + r_f + \beta (r_m - r_f) + \epsilon$$
$$\sim N(\mu_m, \sigma_m) \sim N(0, \sigma_\epsilon)$$



Maybe combine "alpha" with the noise component?

$$r_p = r_f + \beta (r_m - r_f) + F$$
$$\sim N(\mu_m, \sigma_m) \sim N(\alpha, \sigma_\epsilon)$$



Exposure to portfolio with "active" return

 $r_p = r_f + \beta (r_m - r_f) + \frac{\beta_a r_a}{r_a} + \epsilon$

(residual risk)



Fama-French 3-Factor Model

$$r_{p} = r_{f} + \beta_{m}(r_{m} - r_{f}) + \beta_{HML}r_{HML} \quad \text{``Value''} + \beta_{SMB}r_{SMB} \quad \text{``Size''} + \epsilon$$



Factor investing is the implementation of systematic portfolio rules in effort to harvest positive active returns.

Aren't markets efficient?

Where do we expect these "positive active returns" to come from?



- 1. Risk
- 2. Behavioral biases
- 3. Market structure



Risk

Investors are risk averse. Taking on extra risk requires getting extra reward.

Essentially, you're acting as an insurer: collecting a premium so other investors can offload risk.

For that extra risk you bear, you collect a reward.

This does not violate the efficient market hypothesis.



Risk

Commonly cited examples:

The **value premium** comes from buying securities the general market views as being distressed. To hold these riskier securities, you earn a premium.

The **size premium** comes from holding smaller capitalization securities, which are often less liquid. To hold less liquid securities, you earn a premium.



Behavioral bias

Investors exhibit "irrational" cognitive biases that can be exploited by more rational market participants.



Behavioral bias

Commonly cited examples:

The **momentum premium** arises from several cognitive biases, including the anchoring, the disposition effect, and herding.

The **low-volatility premium** arises from an aversion to leverage and the lottery effect.



Market structure

By the way the markets are structured, there may be opportunities to exploit price-insensitive buyers and sellers.



Market structure

Commonly cited examples:

The **fallen angels premium** comes from institutions indiscriminately selling investment grade bonds that have been downgraded.

Excess premium found in **dividend swaps** may arise from banks looking to offload dividend exposure.



How do we research factors?

1. Think of a way to rank stocks



Annualized Returns for Portfolios Formed on Book-to-Price



Source: Kenneth French Data Library; Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.



- 1. Think of a way to rank stocks
- 2. Buy the top-ranked stuff; short sell the bottom-ranked stuff.



16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% Low 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Hi Decile

Annualized Returns for Portfolios Formed on Book-to-Price

Source: Kenneth French Data Library; Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.



- 1. Think of a way to rank stocks
- 2. Buy the top-ranked stuff; short sell the bottom-ranked stuff.
- 3. Profit?



16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% Low 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Hi Decile Average: 9.68% Average: 12.63%

Annualized Returns for Portfolios Formed on Book-to-Price

Source: Kenneth French Data Library; Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.



Why does research focus on long/short approaches?

- *Any* portfolio can be thought as of the market portfolio plus a long/short portfolio
- Allows us to focus on the long/short to quantify value-add.



Why "dollar neutral" long/shorts?

- Self-financing
- Easy to calculate



Dollar neutral is not beta neutral.

(This means that some factors may unintentionally incorporate implicit beta timing...)



Rolling 5-Year Beta Exposure of Momentum Factor



Source: AQR; Calculations by Newfound Research.

Commonly recognized equity factors:

- Value
- Size
- Momentum
- Low-Volatility / Anti-Beta
- Profitability / Quality



Value

Sort stocks based on price-to-book; buy the "cheapest" stocks and short sell the "expensive" stocks.

Theory as to why it works:

- Higher systematic (business cycle) risk
- Investor loss aversion



Value



Source: AQR; Calculations by Newfound Research. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.


Size

Sort stocks based on market capitalization; buy the "smallest" stocks and short sell the "largest" stocks.

Theory as to why it works:

- Higher systematic (business cycle) risk
- Liquidity risk



Size





Momentum

Sort stocks based on prior return; buy the recent "outperforming" stocks and short sell the "underperforming" stocks.

Theory as to why it works:

 Under-reaction and over-reaction to information (caused by disposition effect, information anchoring, and herding)



Momentum





Low-Volatility (Anti-Beta)

Sort stocks based on prior realized volatility (beta); buy the "low-volatility" stocks and short sell the "high-volatility" stocks.

Theory as to why it works:

- Lottery effect
- Leverage aversion

(Note: Some researchers construct this long/short as beta neutral, not dollar neutral)



Low-Volatility (Anti-Beta)





Quality (Profitability)

Sort stocks based on balance sheet quality (e.g. profitability); buy the "high quality" stocks and short sell the "low quality" stocks.

Theory as to why it works:

• Errors-in-expectations



Quality (Profitability)

100





That's it?

This sounds really, really easy...

Some things that make factor investing difficult...

- 1. Is the factor actually data-mined garbage?
- 2. Can we stick with the factor?
- 3. How do we actually implement it?



Dealing with data-mining

What is "data-mining"?

A million monkeys with a million keyboards and infinite time will eventually produce Shakespeare.

A million analysts with a million Bloombergs...



Levi and Welch (2014) examined 600 published factors.

49% produced zero-to-negative premia out-of-sample.

Whoops.



Swedroe and Berkin's framework for sustainability:

- Persistent over time
- Pervasive across geographies
- Investable
- Intuitive

We'd add:

• Simple



Sticking with factors

"If it was easy, everybody would do it."



Often the *method* is easy...

Sticking with it is hard.



Momentum (Log Scale)





Momentum (Linear Scale)





Momentum ("Adjusted" for pain from losses being 2x pleasure from gains)





In fact, for a factor to work, we'd posit it *has* to be hard to stick with?

Why?



Arithmetic of Active Management

- Weighted average return of market participant performance *is* the market return.
- Therefore, out-performance is a "zero sum" game.



Let's assume the factor returns are easy to harvest...

- The approach is viewed as "free money"
- More people will adopt the approach
- Money inflows will drive up prices and valuations
- Increased valuations will drive down forward expected returns
- Out-performance opportunity converges towards zero



With factors...

Weak hands "fold" and pass the alpha to the strong hands with the fortitude to "hold."





Short-term self-fulfilling cycle of further outperformance.

High returns attract

investors

High valuations cause return expectations to turn negative Negative returns lead to out-flows

Out-flows cause a shortterm self-fulfilling cycle of further out-flows

Excess out-flows cause return premiums to turn positive







Bad News

By this logic, no disciplined investment approach (e.g. factors) can outperform all the time.

To work in the long-run, there has to be pain in the short-run.



Good News

By the same logic, no disciplined investment approach can *under*perform all the time either.

(If an approach always *underperforms,* we can invert to create an *outperforming* strategy, which we just said can't exist.)





Implementation Matters

Implementation details to deal with...

- 1. How do we actually define the factor?
- 2. Going from self-financing long/shorts to long-only portfolios



Consider the value factor. Some common ways to define "value":

- Price-to-book
- Price-to-earnings
- Price-to-sales

	Price-to- Book	Price-to- Earnings	Price-to- Sales	Market
Ann. Return	13.9%	15.3%	14.4%	10.8%
Ann. Volatility	16.0%	15.6%	14.9%	14.9%
Sharpe Ratio	0.60	0.70	0.67	0.43

Source: Data from Kenneth French Data Library; Calculations by Newfound Research.



In the long run, they have all worked. In the short run, your mileage may vary.



Source: Data from Kenneth French Data Library; Calculations by Newfound Research.



Where are we spending our active risk? Security level? Sector level?

Some Low-Volatility implementations

- The PowerShares S&P 500 Low Volatility ETF (SPLV)
- The SPDR SSGA US Large Cap Low Volatility ETF (LGLV)
- The iShares Edge MSCI Min Vol USA ETF (USMV)



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<u>Method</u>

- Rank S&P 500 stocks based on trailing 12-month realized volatility
- Pick top 100 with lowest realized volatility
- Weight based on inverse proportion to realized 12-month volatility



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<u>Method</u>

- Assign stocks from the Russell 1000 to their respective 10 sectors
- Rank stocks within their sector based on trailing 60-month realized volatility
- For each sector, pick the lowest volatility stocks until total free float market cap reaches 30% of the sector total
- Weight each stock in proportion to its inverse realized 60-month variance (i.e., 1 / volatility squared), constrained to the lesser of 5% or 20x the index weight.



Some Low-Volatility Implementations

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<u>Method</u>

- Optimization-based
- Re-weight holdings in MSCI USA Index to create minimum-volatility portfolio subject to sector and security-level constraints.



They can't *all* be right, can they?

- **SPLV:** The "vanilla" low-volatility approach.
- **LGLV:** Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen (2014) find evidence to support the approach while De Carvalho, Zakaria, Lu and Moulin (2014) find that sector-neutral, low-volatility approaches may actually be more efficient at harvesting alpha than non-sector neutral approaches.
- **USMV:** De Carvalho, Lu, and Moulin (2012) find that the key factor exposures in a minimum variance portfolio is low beta and low residual volatility stocks. So despite a more opaque construction methodology, USMV should tap into the same low volatility factor as SPLV and LGLV.


Finally, let's talk about these long/short portfolios again...

Academically they are nice to work with. Practically, they can cause problems in creating "long-only" factor-tilted portfolios.



Simple Example

V	Veight			Weight			Weight
A	30%	+	Α	-100%	=	Α	-70%
В	70%		В	100%		В	170%
Market Portfolio			"Dollar-Neutral" Long/Short			Portfolio with shorting and leverage	



The problem with going long-only: the short side can be constrained by how much you can reduce a position to zero.

Why does it matter?

- Which side of the factor creates the most value: the long or short side?
- Are there important interaction effects between the long and short sides?



Example: Hypothetical "size" factor example:

- Short the top 20% of S&P 500
- Long the bottom 20% of S&P 500
- Positions are market-cap weighted
- Sides are held dollar-neutral



Implied L/S Weight

Source: State Street; Invesco; Calculations by Newfound Research; Implied long/short portfolio calculated on 3/17/2017.



But when we try to "overlay" this long/short on the S&P 500, we hit a problem:

- AAPL wants to be -5.66% of short leg
- AAPL is only 3.66% of the S&P 500.

In long-only implementation, we can only get 64% of the long/short factor applied.



What if instead of doing an overlay, we buy *just* the long leg?

Creates leg sizing mismatch:

- 100% exposure to the long leg
- Still only 64% of the short leg



Worse, a "buy the long leg" implementation for more dynamic factors can create unintentional timing of short-leg exposure.



Extreme example:

	Desired Long/Short Exposure	Implemented	Implied Exposure		
		Exposure	Long-Leg	Short-Leg	
T=0	Long Small-Cap / Short Large-Cap	Bottom 20%	100%	64%	
T=1	Long Large-Cap / Short Small-Cap	Top 20%	100%	3.5%	



The devil is in the implementation details...



Can we "time" factor exposure?

First, what do we mean by "timing"?

There are two types:

- Relative: "There are better things to be in."
- Absolute: "I just shouldn't be in this thing."



Relative Timing

Abstract for a paper I co-authored in early 2016 and submitted to the NAAIM Wagner Award competition.

When outperformance fixation leads to large inflow temptation: premiums erode, investors unload, enabling factor rotation!

(We didn't win.)



Rotation Type #1: "Switching"

Idea: Factors go through cycles; can we switch between the "good" and "bad" side of factors to time them?

	Positive Side	Negative Side
Value	Cheap	Expensive
Size	Small	Large
Quality	High	Low
Momentum	Winners	Losers
Beta	Low Volatility	High Beta



Rotation Type #1: "Switching"

Results using a momentum-based approach? Generally poor.



Relative Performance of Momentum Switching vs. Factor Buy & Hold

Source: Data from Kenneth French Data Library; Calculations by Newfound Research.



Rotation Type #2: "Relative"

Idea: The positive sides go through outperformance at different periods. Can we tilt towards those showing recent outperformance and away from those showing underperformance?



Rotation Type #2: "Relative"

Results using a momentum-based rotation approach? It works. (But is it worth the headache?)



Source: Data from Kenneth French Data Library; Calculations by Newfound Research.



Absolute Timing



Rob Arnott Research Affiliates

February 2016 – How Can "Smart Beta" Go Horribly Wrong?

- Some factor returns (e.g. low volatility) are overstated due to longterm, un-repeatable valuation multiple expansion.
- Current valuations vs. historic levels for some factors are overextended, portending lower future returns if not an outright "factor crash." *Caveat emptor!*









Cliff Asness AQR April 2016 – The Siren Song of Factor Timing

- Using value-spreads to time factors is not particularly useful.
- Which value measure you use completely changes your answer.
- No matter the measure, value spreads are within "normal" levels not like we saw in the dot-com bubble for the value factor.
- Resist the urge to time factors!

Note: This is all very ironic because it was Asness who in 2000 introduced the very idea of using value spreads to time the value factor.





Rob Arnott Research Affiliates

June 2016 – To Win with "Smart Beta" Ask If the Price Is Right

 Relative valuation does a good job of predicting subsequent 5year performance for U.S. equity factors.



• Tested "out-of-sample" against international factors. "In Developed ex US and emerging markets, across most horizons, relative valuations and future returns have overwhelmingly negative relationships."





Cliff Asness AQR

June 2016 – *My Factor Philippic*

- Directionally agrees on which factors are expensive and which are cheap, but nowhere near as extreme as Arnott.
- Arnott's method of regression overstates the use of value-spread timing, particularly for high-turnover factors.
 - Having a crystal ball and knowing that valuations contract for small-cap stocks over the next five years is meaningful because the small-cap universe remains fairly static.
 - Using that same crystal ball to see that valuations will contract for a momentum strategy over the next five years is less meaningful because the securities held could be 100% different. Is the contraction due to value changes or just different holdings?





Cliff Asness AQR

June 2016 – My Factor Philippic (Cont.)

• Significant disagreement as to whether long-term factor returns are *real* or based on valuation-spread changes.

Arnott forgets to account for "frictions" in his analysis!

- Portfolio turnover
- Changes in fundamentals (but not price)





Rob Arnott Research Affiliates

September 2016 – *Timing "Smart Beta" Strategies?* Of Course! Buy Low, Sell High!

- Factor timing based on value works! (But should be done sparingly, as it might increase concentration risk.)
- Anecdotal evidence of "performance chasing" seen in asset owners is a form of market timing.
- Based on returns alone, performance chasing smart beta is a drag; contrarian timing a boon.
- Buying the cheapest factors outperforms a diversified, equalweight factor portfolio.
- Using a valuation-based approach to timing *does not* double down on the value factor, since valuations are measured for each factor relative to past valuations.





Cliff Asness AQR

March 2017 – Contrarian Factor Timing is Deceptively Difficult

- "In multiple online white papers, Arnott and co-authors present evidence in support of contrarian factor timing based on a plethora of mostly inapplicable, exaggerated, and poorly designed tests that also flout research norms."
- That said, value-spreads at *extreme* levels (think value 1999-2000) should be an eyebrow raiser.
- But we <u>agree</u> on performance chasing problems with factors. Chasing strong results is a recipe for disaster.
- That said, "mild positive power" does not make a good timing strategy.
- You're still better off just diversifying.





Diversifying Factors

Diversifying factors

Turns out, we can't even agree on how to diversify factors.



The Composite Approach

Diversifying factors

Approach #1: Composite

- Also known as "portfolio blend."
- Give factor scores to each security.
- Build individual portfolios for each factor (e.g. choose securities with top scores for that factor).
- Blend portfolios together as sleeves.



Diversifying factors



Source: Ghayur, Heaney, and Platt (2016)



The Integrated Approach

Diversifying factors

Approach #2: Integrated

- Also known as "signal blend."
- Give factor scores to each security.
- Blend factor scores together to create a single composite score.
- Create factor portfolio using composite score (e.g. choose securities with top composite score).



Diversifying factors



Source: Ghayur, Heaney, and Platt (2016)



Comparing Approaches

Diversifying factors



Source: Ghayur, Heaney, and Platt (2016)

Area 1: In both

Area 2: In integrated but *not* in composite

Area 3: In composite but *not* in integrated



Diversifying factors

General Arguments for Composite

- Composite approach is more transparent.
- Factor research has been on single factors without enough evidence about potential *interaction* effects.
- Factor alphas decay at different horizons so composite signal will be driven by highest turnover factor.


General Arguments for Integrated

- Composite portfolios can create inefficient *canceling out* effects in Area 3.
- Integrated approaches can introduce implicit leverage, allowing you to use the same dollar to invest in multiple factors simultaneously.



Capital Efficiency

Are integrated portfolios actually more capital efficient?

Analytical research performed by Newfound¹:

- Assume securities have assigned z-scores for each factor.
- Build composite portfolio by equal-weighting top X% of securities for each factor based on z-score.
- Build integrated portfolio by summing z-scores and equalweighting the top X% of securities based on composite z-score.
- "Capital efficiency" is measured as expected aggregate portfolio z-score per factor.



Result? Under this setup, integrated portfolios are always just as – if not significantly more – capital efficient than composite portfolios.





Source: Newfound Research

Result? Under this setup, integrated portfolios are always just as – if not significantly more – capital efficient than composite portfolios.





Source: Newfound Research

Interaction Effects

Research from AQR (Fitzgibbons, Friedman, Pomorski, and Serban (2016))

- Theoretical: Simulation-based; momentum and value; assume equal style efficacy; equal-weight holdings; match # of stocks held by each approach
- Empirical: MSCI World; 1993-2015; value and momentum; constraints: 80% of active risk budget spent *in* industry and 20% across industries.



Theoretical Results (Assuming Tracking Error of 2.5%)



Source: Fitzgibbons, Friedman, Pomorski, and Serban (2016)



Empirical Results (Assuming Tracking Error of 4%)

Panel B: Various groupings of stocks: Alphas versus the cap-weighted market

		Blue stocks (integrated only)	Green stocks (in both portfolios)
Average number of stocks	253.6	178.3	164.1
Alpha to MSCI World	1.4%	3.2%	4.2%
t-statistic	(0.96)	(3.09)	(3.67)
Average Weight in the respective portfolio	52%	45%	

Figure 1d: Comparing mix, integrated portfolio



As predicted, Area 3 stocks Exhibit less alpha than Areas 1 & 2

Source: Fitzgibbons, Friedman, Pomorski, and Serban (2016)





Empirical research from the ActiveBeta team at Goldman Sachs Asset Management:

- Test U.S. equity portfolios built from momentum and value factors from 1979-2016.
- Focus on *factor-equivalent* portfolios (i.e. composite and integrated portfolios with the same overall factor exposure).
- Two tests: "low concentration" and "high concentration" exposure.



Low Concentration Test Results

Annualized Active Returns for Value/Momentum Quadrants



This is almost the *exact opposite* result that integrated proponents claim should happen.

Interaction effects in areas of offsetting exposures may actually be beneficial...



Source: Ghayur, Heaney, and Platt (2016)

High Concentration Test Results

Still **positive interactive effects in Area 3** ... but too much **idiosyncratic risk taken on in Area 1** for the composite approach.

	Value Exposure Contribution	Momentum Exposure Contribution	Average Active Return	Active Return Contribution	Active Risk Contribution		
Signal Blend							
Shared Securities	0.43	0.52	4.62%	2.13%	3.48%		
Securities Held Only in Signal Blend	0.31	0.29	3.76%	1.42%	2.35%		
Securities Not Held	0.13	0.14	-0.74%	0.63%	1.03%		
Portfolio Blend							
Shared Securities	0.70	0.84	4.62%	3.42%	6.19%		
Securities Held Only in Portfolio Blend	0.08	0.04	4.38%	0.61%	1.34%		
Securities Not Held	0.09	0.10	-0.49%	0.43%	0.82%		



Sweeping Generalizations

Integrated portfolios should be more "capital efficient" than composite approaches.



Empirical evidence supporting the theoretical arguments about "canceling out" effects are mixed.



At low-to-moderate target factor exposures, a composite approach can offer a higher information ratio due to beneficial interaction effects.



At higher target factor exposures, composite approaches require too much idiosyncratic risk.



This is all to say nothing of the many other impactful portfolio construction decisions... In conclusion...

Factors are systematic approaches to investing that seek to harvest excess return arising either from (1) risk, (2) behavioral biases, or (3) market structure inefficiencies.



We want to look for simple, robust, and pervasive factors approaches.



Even if they work, they are going to be tough to stick with.

(That's what makes them work!)



Academic research does not necessarily transfer to practice: implementation details matter.



The jury is still out on factor timing.





You're probably better off just diversifying your factor exposure.



The jury is still out on how to diversify.

(You should probably do it anyway.)



Thank you.



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